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The doctrine of a property right in intellec-
tual conceptions is the latest refinement of the idea of
property; and it is even now not universally accepted.
Among the nations of antiquity and of the Middle Ages it
seems not to have been recognized; the munificent pat-
ronage so often in those times accorded to literature
and the arts being, as the name imorts, a benefaction
rather than a just tribute to an established right.
The development of this last property conception may
best be observed by first tracing its growth in England.
In order to stimulate trade and advance com-
merce the early kings often granted exclusive rights to
certain -ersons to engage in the importation and sale of
specified articles of merchandize; and sometimes the ex-
clusive ri,;ht to trade with certain foreign states.
The granting of these privile,;es was a prerogative of
the crown; and, as such, came to be greatly abused. It
was used almost solely to advance the royal interest;
though occasionally, as in the case of the exclusive
rights and patents in early Americal colonial history,it
was based upon a wise public policy. Nearly every
trade was pursued under these grants, which also assumed
in time the form of protection to useful inventions.
The abuse of this power under the Tudors be-
came unendurable; and finally, in the reign of Eliza-
beth, the Youse of Lords introduced a bill for its res-
traint. The queen, wishing to suppress legislation on
the subject, proposed a compromise; but before it was
effected she died. Yer successor, James the First, car-
ried the abuse to still greater excess; and at last, in
the twenty first year of his reign, a statute was enac-
ted known as an"Act for the Suppression of Nonopolies",
which abolished this power, except, for a limited period
in the case of inventions in manufactures. Thus, in
recognition of its value, was established the princiy!e
of a patent right. This was in 1623, and the Act re-
mained without change until the 5 and 6 of William the
Fourth, Chap. 83,- 1835. In fact its establis ent
and growth were slow; and the importance of the statute
was not at first perceived. Blackstone in his Com-
mentaries sums up the law on this subject almost in a
single se ntence. Diihring the reign of Victoria le-
islaion has been more active, and many important amend-
ments have been made; notably The Patent Law Amendment
Act, of 1-5 and 16 Victoria, Chap. 83, 1852; the Act
changing the seal, 1877; and the late revision of 1883.
The tendency of this legislation has been de -
cidedly in Thvor of the patentee; the noteworthy feature
of the Act of l886 being a reduction of the fees,which
were originally levied for purposes of revenue. The
copyright laws of England originated at a later date;
although licenses were granted to publishers as early as
1504, when the first Royal Printer was a pointed. This
however, merely protected the printer, not the author.
Literary "piracy" was carried on without redress until
the enactment of the famous statute of 4 Queene Anne, for
the "Encouragement of Learning. " Many enactments
have followed; and at present an author may obtain a
copyright for his production covering a term of forty
two years; or, for his lifetime and seven years there-
after. If the publication take place after the death
of the a-ithor, a copyright for forty two years may be
obtained.
America is the next nation, in point of time,
to recognize by law this property; but, in order better
to base our conclusions, we will glance briefly at the
patent and copyright laws of other countries.
France passed her first act upon the subject
of patents in 1787. Eer patent laws are similar to
those of The United States, except that the fees exac-
ted are much higher. The orii. -a! expense of obtainin-.
a patent is about one hundred and twenty dollars, with
an annual tax of twenty dollars, for a term of fifteen
years, which is the duration: of the patent. The
French copyright laws are the most liberal in Europe.
Gernany first enacted a patent law in 1815.
As at present administered, anyone, inventor or not,may
procure a patent. Thus the rights of the :atentee
are not wholly secured. The cost of obtaining a patent
is very considerable, amounting to seventeen and one -
ha'f dollars the first year; double the -,oint the sec-
ond year; with a like addition yearly for fifteen years
when the grant ceases.
sued as in Prance. T
'lot so iiany patents are is-
he copyright laws of Geiirnany are
ver-,y liberal.
Ru-ssia enacted ratent laws in 1812-1-5. They
are similar to the Ainerican laws, but render patents
more expensive. A three years' patent costs one hun-
dred and sixty dollars; one for five years two hundredi
dollars; and one for ten years four hundred and twenty
dollars.
The patent laws of Belgiu, adopted in 1816- 1 7
are much more liberal than those of the other continent-
al states.
Between 1820 and 1845 all the other nations of
Europe, excepting Switzerland and Turkey, enacted laws
of this class.
Keeping in mind the above dates it will be
seen, as before stated, that at the tie of our estab-
lisment as a nation, England stood alone in acknowled _-
inl by statuite that there were property rights as real
and as equitable in the products of mind as in those
which assumed a tangible and visible form. With the
single example of Eng land before them, does it not speak
highly of the wisdom of the framers of our Constitution
that they provided so liberally for the protection of
this right, the embodiment of a principle so subtile as
scarcely to have been recognized in the body of European
jurisprudence. Among the provisions of the Constitu-
tion is the following:
The Congress shall have power. . . . To pro-
mote the progress of science and the usefil arts, by se-
curing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the'
ri!,'ht to thwir respective writings and discoveries.
Thus we, find that our patent law is based upon a
positive declar, tion; while in England it was rrierel:r an
exception to a prohibitory statute.
( Owing to the bread th of the subject,only the
Law of Patents will hereafter be noticed. )
The first Act tnder the provisions of the Con-
stitution was passed April 10, 1790. It provided
that " Any person who has invented or discovered any n'rw
or useful art, machine, manufacture, or any new or use-
ful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor."
In 1796 the provision was amended, and"composition
of matter" was inserted after"manufacture."
There has been subsequent legislation on this brancb
of the Constitution; but it has been with reference to
minor details, the statute of 1793 being substantially
the one in force to-day.
In the English law the word "'manufactnre" desig-
nates anything for which a patent may be issue'. The
meaning of the term has thus been greatly enlar;ed so : s
to include those inventions that are not strictly i'ian-
factures, but shoulc nevertheless be equitablyT protec-
ted. American law, -n the other hand, endeavors to
provide terms that will cover every case. It has been
necessary, however, that these terms, and, in fact,
nearly every word of the constitutional provision,should
receive judicial interpretation; and if we would ascer-
tain the liberality of our patent laws it is necessary
that we become familiar with the judicial construction
of these provisions. These will be treated, so far a,3
ray be, under the following heads:
I. The Nature of Letters Patent.
II. To Whom TLetters Patent may be issued.
II!.The Extent of Letters Patent.
IV. The Tiiration of :,otters Pe tont.
V The Subject-Matter of !,etters Patent
a. Art
b. M~achine
c. MIanmfacture
d. Composition of Matter.
VI. Invention or Discovery.
VII. "ovelty.
VITI.Prior Use.
IX. Two Years Public Use.
X. Prior Invention.
XI. Utility.
I. The ITature of Letters Patent.
The term " letters :atent", employed to designate
the instnument which is issued to a patentee in recogni
tion of his right, has descended to us from the ear'y
history of the mother country, though bearing little of
its former meaning, " a grant of a monopoly." Under
our law it assumes the nature of a contract between the
government and the individual, wviereby the government
recognizes the rig- t of an individual, as against all
other individuals, to the ownership and control of his
own conceptions, and -,Larantees him protection for a
limited time, if he, as consideration therefor, will
make known his invention, and will surrender it at the
expiration of the time limnted, to the commonwealth.
The provision is thus two-fold in its nature: Lenefic-
iary, giving the inventor an exclusive right to sell 2nd
uise; and Prohibitory, forbidding an unauthorized use
thereof by others. Though this is the product of pos-
itive law, yet the patentee possesses a property right
in the subject matter as real and as absolute as man ac-
quires in anything that is the product of his toil.
TI. To Whom Letters Patent may be issued.
Any person, citizen or alien, being the original
inventor, registered assignee, executor or administrator
of the original inventor, may obtain a l-atent. An
employe in the Patent Office can take only by inheritance
A patent may be granted to two or more persons if
it was jointly invented by them; but a patent granted to
two or more when only one invented is void. So, also,
is a patent granted to one person, where several parti-
cipated in the invention. Here mechanical labor will
not entitle a party to be joined; he rmust invent.
III. The Extent of Letters Patent.
The grant of letters patent extends over all the
possessions of the United States, and to its vessels
upon the high seas, or wherever they are.
Gardner vs Yowe. 2 Clifford 464.
Foreign ships within our waters may use the article pat-
ented on board; but they must not make or sell it.
Brown vs Duchesne 19 1oward
IV. The Durction of Letters Patent.
The duration of all letters patent granted in The
United States is seventeen years, with the exception of
patents for designs, wbich are for three and one-half,
seven, or fourteen years, at the option of the appli-
cant; Patents obtained here fo :- inventions made and
patented abroad expire at the time of the expiration of
the foreign patent, the whole term not being more than
seventeen Iyears.
The re-issue of a patent in a foreign countr:, does
not secure a re-issue of the patent here.
Bate Refrigerating Co. vs Gillett 13 Fed. Rep. 553
V. The Subject-Natter of Letters Patent.
a. Art.
The term "art" has a mch narrower meaning vinder l atent
198.
As applied to patents it is
used as synonymous with "process", which may be defined
as "An operation perforned by rnle to produce a resiilt
not enti rel r mechanical". It will be seen thut the
term "process" is not used in its gener !c sense. Art
and "process", in this sense, are liable to be confusel,
and are often mistaken for each other. }'ormerly it
was almost impossible to tell whether a case fell within
the one term or the other; but we have now four cases
which fully illustrate the difference adid, if used hy-
pothetically, will enable us to decide
Mc Clurg vs Kingsland 1 Jroward
1lowry vs Whitney 14 Wallace
Tilglrnan vs Proctor 102 U. S.
O' Reilly vs MIorse 15 howard
with certainty.
212
620
707
112
Three of these cases,- those testing the patents issued
to I-arley, Whitney, and Tilghman,- were decided in favor
of the patentees, on the ground that they covered a pro-
law than in popular nse.
cess; while the 11orse claim was defected because it was
for a p-inciple.
'rlhe rile dechicible from these cases is as follo :Is"
A patent for a procoss iS ,i patent for the combined use
of all the lasw of nautre described and utilized in that
invention; whereas a principle is one of those fLndamren-
tal laws. If a patent could be obtained for the dis-
covery of a law of nature, the chief end of patent law-
the stimulating of investigation- would be thwarted by
the tieing up of the newly d- scovered natural principle.
b. Machine
One of the best definitions of a machine is given
by Judge Grier in his opinion in
Corning vs Burden 15 }-oward
} e says : "The term 'machine' includes every mechanical
device and combination of mechanical powers and devices
to perform some Thnction, and produce a certain result
Ye still fhrther disting- ishes between a
267
or effect. "
machine and a discovery by saying that the former is in-
vented and the latter di:icovered. For instance, a po-
son might discover a new and useful methjod of dyeing;
and then, by inventing a machine to facilitate the work,
obtain a patent for each.
Co * anufacture.
This term has been found almost as difficult of in-
terpretation in our patent law as in that of England;
here the tendency being to abridge, and there to enlarie
the meaning. The follow ing definition is drawn from
the decision in Cornel vs Xinne, Webster's Patent
Cases, 5-7:
M 1 ianufacture, as the subject of a patent, may be
any new combination of old materials constituting a new
result or production,in the form of a vendable article,
not being machinery."
d. Composition of flatter.
This term includes medicines, copositions used in
the arts, etc., where they are made of substances suit-
able for sale separately.
The patent may be for the composition, the article
produced, or the process of compounding it.
A combination of the four definitions above given
covers the entire field of patentable inventions and
discoveries. Simple as they seem, they are terms of a
broad and far-reaching character; requiring years of
searching investigation to place them even upon the dis-
puted footing they now hold.
VI. Invention or Discovery.
Paving ascertained the extent of the subject-matter
for which patents may be granted, we will now see what
is required of the applicant to entitle him to a patent.
First: Ye must invent of discover something included
within the meaning of one o- the other of the terms "In-
vention"and "Discovery." These terms have nearly the
same menining given tlem by the courts, and are often
used interchangeably. Itr. Walker in his worx on patents
tori's them synonymous; but the distinction established
in Corning vs Burden - alluded to above- and discernible
in other decisions, should be maintained.
A chemist may vary tho proportions of two or more
ingredientsand mingle them again and again, until final1,
a certain combination being obtained, they unite, and a
new and useful substance is discovered.
anything?
'id he invent
Did he not rather discover that certain chem-
icals, mixed in certain proportions, would prod'ice a cer-
tain result?
in order to determine what is "Invention" or "Dis-
covery" w- have again to recur to the decisions of the
courts,and we find that it is easier to draw the line by
considering w]t-It may not be called by those names, rather
than by attempting a positive definition. A' was be-
fore remarked- nnder the topis "Art"- an abstract prin-
ciple cannot be patented. Only a practical embodiment
of it in some machine or method rendering it available
and riseful,is patentable.
Silsby vs Forte
The case of
20 } oward
seems to me to antagonize this doctrine. >orte inven-
ted a method of repglating the draft of stoves by util-
izin: the expansive properties of metals, when subjected
to different degrees of heat, and claimed a patent for
the utilization of these properties for this purpose.
The claim certainl)r was not confined to the mechanism he
had devised, but covered the 1rinciple, and precluded
experiment in this direction duing the term of his pat-
T am quite unable to distingui sh the lega! prin-ent .
20
ciple involved 1n this case from that in the 8th claim
of Mlorse, whic]h wns for all moues of conrrumriicating at -i
distu-nce by si ns made with th? use of electricity.
This claim was disallowed becanse it covered the monop-
oly of a principle. The expansion and contraction of
i-ietals when subjected to heat is as much a nat-iral prin-
ciple as the expansive -. roperty of steam; and Watts
might as justly have -atented his discovery as could
Forte in this instance.
An effect alone is not patentable; as, for instance
the measurement of time. It is only the new mode or
appliance for producing the effect that may be patented.
If the effect be obtained br the use of a previously
known appliance, though it may heretofore have been nised
for a different purpose, no patent can be obtained; for
the appliance is regarded as having been designed for
every purpose for which it can be i-sed.
An illustration of this pri.nciple is found where the ap-
plication of ether,in surgery, was held not to be pat-
entable, as it was merely the appxication of an old
agent, by old means, to an old object.
alone' was new.
'he effect
Ifeans, new or old, may be patented 8o
used to the exclusion of allothers in the application of
new properties to :roduce new results.
vs Yiggins 10 U. S.
It is the design of the patent law to stimulate
invention in now fields and to advance the useful arts.
If patents were granted for unimportant impr,-vements and
alterations they would constitute a system of monopolies
as baneful as that under the Tudors. r onscious of
this, the courts have guarged carefully the administra-
tion of these laws; arid they have held that the making
of a device such as any skilled mechanic could produce
when needed does not render it patentable.
Corn Planter Patent
591
26223 W1allace
Judge Nelson held that the mere substitution of ma-
terial of su]perior quality would not warrant a patent.
Yotchkins vs Greonwood 11 77oward 266
This decision was followed in
ex arte U.S. Appeal cases, D.C. 1859,
where the substitution of a jewel for a glass in a ma-
chine , to prevent friction, was held to be not patent-
able.
Mere improvement in workmanship, also, is not pat-
ent able.
Buzzell vs Fifield 7 Fed. Rep.
The distinctions drawn in cases of this character,
however, are very nice; a dissenti!g opinion having been
rendered in the case jnst above cited.
The holding of the courts at, present seems to be
that if the substitute improves the result, or if the
material substituted was not before known, a patent may
be secured.
Leilson Case- Webster's Patent Cases
467
14.
It is not invention to ch;IIe the degree, substi-
tute equivalents, or omit sori, part, unless the S,4 d
chan;o, substitution, or omission prodiices a nosw result.
Smith vs -i chols 21 Wall.
Aggregation, to be patentable, myust accomplish a new
result, peculiar to the combination, and resulting,, from
it alone. The parts may act sep' rately or simultano-
ously; but each muist be essential to the combination.
i-ailes vs Van vormer 20 Wall. b53
lUovelty may usually be detected by an application
of these rules; but, if they fail, it has been held in
England- followed to some extent in this country- that
a device which has gone into general use , and has dis-
place(! other devices, before employed for a similar pu--
pose, may be deem- ied patentable.
VII. Novelty.
Novelty, another requisite for constituting a pat-
115
entable invention, hs a broader mea!-ing unn er the j)-at-
ent law than is ordinarily assigned to it. A study of
cases which fall without the definition of actual new-
ness, and are :,et patentable, is the only means of ar-
riving at a definition of the term, as used in this
branch of the law.
T'orei-n Patents and Publications.
Anything of a patentable nature that has not been
patented abroad, -or a description or plan of which p .in
ted or published abroad, may be patented in this country
if it possess the othey requisites necessary to a -atent;
and this, though it may long have been known, provif'ed
the patentee's idea was original with e
Ilingworth vs Spaulding 7 Fed. Rep.
The publication or patent abroad ri'zst have preceded
the date of the invention in this couintry; not merely
the date of the issuing of th- patent.
Elizabeth vs Pavement Co. 7 Otto
611
126
An abandoned application is not considered as such
publication.
'.owes vs Me Neal 5 Bann I Ard
The previous exi. tence of an uni: ublished drawinpg or
a model, though the thin , invented is fil!y rep +roent d
therein, will not invalidate a patent afterwards secured
The reason may seem technical, as it is based upon the
ground that the knowledge or use of a drawing or model
is not the knowledge or use of the thing itself. Tt
is doubtless also based upon the ground of public policy
for, if a patent could be defeated in this way, an op-
portunity would be given for fraud and perjury.
VIII. Prior Use.
An invention, to be patentable, must not have been
known or used by others in this country, previous to the
application for the patent, although it may have been
known and used for an indefinite period lsewhere; pro -
vided the inventor here was ignorant of such use.
Mr. Walker, in his lectures on this subject, gives
a very interesting case recently decided in accordance
with this docttrine. A patent was issued for a window
sta, ,r fastener, and, a suit having been instituted un-
der it, the defence set up that a similar stay was in
iise, for the same purpose, in the church at Wittenberg
on the door of which Luther nailed his "Theses". On
plaintiff's rroving that he had no knowledge of such
prior use, the patent was sustained.
The prior use must be a public use; though in
Allios vs Stowell
Judge Dyer says:
9 Fed. Rep. 6504
" Of course the familiar rule is that
where it is claimed that a patented device is anticipa-
ted by another, and that there has been a prior use, it
is necessary to show, not perhaps that the anticipating
device has been actually used, but certainly that it is
capable of practical and succossfhil so. Te It
to be little support for this statement in the decisions
of the courst.
The length of time an invention may have been used
is immaterial. It may have been used but once, and
by a single person; yet, if inpublic, with an idea of
pecuniary profit and not wholly for experiment, the in-
ventor is presumed to have abandoned it to the world.
Parker vs Folme 1 Fish Pat. Cases 44
Colt vs Mass. Arms Co. 1 Fish Pat. Cases 108
Two inventions may be very like; but if constructed
with different objects in view, one is riot held to have
anticipated the other.
Colburn et al vs Schroeder et al 8 Fed. Rep. 519
IX. Two Years Public Use.
It is often a visable that some test of the effic-
iency of a design or process should be made before a
here seems
patent is obtained; and it may be that the design or
process is of such a nature that experiments could not
be carried on without making it public; as, for instance
the testing of the durability of pavement compositions.
The statute of 1790 contained the phrase "not be-
fore known or used"; and from the wording of this phrase
it was impossible to 6etermine whether this meant "known
or used" prior to the invention, or,prior to the appli-
tion for a patent. The courts, however, held it to
mean prior to the application.
Pennock vs 7i alogui e 2 Peters 1
The statute of 1793 removed all doubt upon this
point by expressly inserting the words "before applica-
tion. " This rule was construed literally; and was
followed in every case but one. The exception was made
where the invention was unlawftlly taken away, and used
without the knowledge or consent of the inventor.
Pennock vs Dialogue 2 Peters
The Act of 1836 did not change the law; but, like
the statute of 1795, incorporated in it the decisions of
the con)rts. The Act of 1839 passed over this matter;
bit the Act of 1870, remyin,' the defects, in this res-
pect, of former acts, granted that If an invention had
not been in public use, or on sale, for more than two
years, a patent could be obtained. This is substan-
tially the law at present; and it would seem plain en-
ough did we not find that it has proved a source of con-
tent ion. The first question to arise under the Act was
Does public use mean nse by the public, or use in public. ?
It was held to designate use In public.
Henry vs Providence Tool Co. 14 off. Gazette 858
But it was afterward held that if the use was mere-
ly experimental, it would not invali,'ate the claim, even
though it had covered a period of more than two years.
Pavement Company vs Elizabeth 6 Off. Gazette 522.
Campbell vs New York City 20 off. Gazette 1317
In order to defeat a patent, an invention in public
use must have been perfected; and the srm,, in the eye
of the law, as that patented.
Tt should also be remembered that often an inventor
applies again and apain for a patent before receivin,- it
and, in view of this fact, it has been held that if he
uses reasonable diligence, even two years will not bar
him.
Smith vs O'Connor 4 Official Gazette
X Prior Invention.
As this is a subject, similar in many particulars
to "Prior Use", it is appropriate to treat it in this
place. It differs from the latter in that when Prior
Use is pleaded as a defence, it is not material whether
the use was by the inventor or otherwise; while in
Prior Invention it is the very essence of the patent
that the claimant was the inventor, and always intended
to L-rocure a patent.
,\gairn, in Prior Invention it need bg only a well
evidenced conception; provided this conception be follow
ed by a successful reduction to practice, and either a
patent aqpplied for, or the invention brourht into public
use with reasonable diligence.
Redfield vs Yunt 1 Hason 602
Tt is not necessary that the invention should have
been reduced to practical form, if the inventor was using
reasonable diligence to accomplish this object.
Cox vs Griggs 2 Tis
Colt vs Ilass. Arms Co.
h Pat. Cases
1 Fish Pat. Cases 108
Judge Ingersoll in 7llithorpe vs Robertson seems to
have held a different opinion; but if we apply his re-
marks to the case in hand, we find that the plaintiff
did not use reasonable diligence; and that it was large-
ly on this account that the adverse decision was render-
ed.
Smith vs O'Connor 4 Official Gazette 666
U. S. Stamping Co. vs Jewett 7 1 ed. 2 eP.
lectric R. R. Signal Co. vs J-all R. R. Signal Co.
6 Federal Rop. 606
Judge Lowell held that thQ prior invention r;-st have
attained a practical result; which is contrary to the
decisions on this question rendered generally by the
c ourt s. The mle, as it a 1 pears from the cases cited,
is, that he who first conceives the idea, if he uses
reasonable diligence, and succeeds finally in rttaining
lis object, is prior to him who invents later; even
though the later inventor may complete and perfect the
invention sooner.
"Conception", Reduction to Practice" and "Reasonable
Diligence. "
Conception means not only the knowledge that it
would be advantageous to produce a certain thing, but
also a distinct and clear perception of the end to be
839
attained, and the means to that end.
Woodman vs Stimpson 6 7'ish Pat. Cases 105
it was once held that drawings and3 models, if exact
representations of the thing afterward produced, were
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of ReCuction to
Practice. iut in Z1lithorpe vs Robertson(super) a dif-
ferent rule was laid down, and it has since been follow-
ed; namely: There MLIst be a worlking machine made; but
i need not be reduced to actual public use if a patent
be applied for with due diligence.
f.Iany questions may arise under the term "Due Dili-
gence"; and usually in deciding this question reference
is had to the complexity of the machine , Pnd the ill-
ness, or even the -poverty, of the inventor. The pro-
vision is never allowed to won- injustice to the inven-
tor.
XI Utility.
In order to be patentable inventions must be use -
fil1; but the degree of usefulness is not prescribed.
They are considered with reference as to whether or. not
they are frivolus, or injurious to the well-being of so-
02. t 1r. The absolute utility may be very small; but
the question of compara-tive utility arises only when the
question of infringement is under discussion, and when
the question is as to whether a certain patented device
and another one complained of are substantially identi-
cal. The question of comparative utility is difficult
of determination. If the chanr'e from the prior inven-
tion has been slight, and the utility increased bt lit-
tle, there is not much likelihood of establishing a sub-
stantia! difference. But if the apparent change is con-
siderable, and the increase in utility noticeable, it is
generally satisf! cto'y evidence that the objects com-
pared are not a]-ik,.
This review of the patentability of inventions
as provided for in our Constitution, acted upon by Con-
gress ,nd -nterpreted by the courts, will not completely
attain the object for which it was written if it does
not make manifest the dual nature of our law; its liber-
ality toward the inventor, and its carefuil watchfiklness
for the general weal. The inventor is allowed the
benefit of every doubt, and his circumstances are taken
into account; but otherwise he rmst use reasonable dili-
gence in giving his conceptions to the :ublic. Je
cannot establish a monopoly of a natural principle and
thus preclude chances of improvement by subsequent in-
vestigators.
Our system of patent laws is not in any sense a sys
tern of rewards, but one of jiistice. A person who ac-
quires property by devise, by loan, by traffic, or by
the labor of his hands, is protected in the possession
and enjoyment of it. But how rmuch above the heir, the
banker, the merchant, or even he who delves in the soil
of the earth and forces her to yield her increase, is he
who delves in the depths of the mind and brings forth
for the comfort and happiness of men inventions that
will be a blessing forever. It is this inventive fac-
ulty, fostered and stimulated by the liberal protection
of our laws, that has made us one of the first of the
manufacturing, as well as the first of the agricultural
nations of the globe; that has elevated and dignified
the lives of our laborers and surrounded them with ob-
jects of use and comfort; and that has given to us , as
nation, that solid basis of material prosperity upon
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which must be built whatever of greatness we attain to.

